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 THE DIFFERENTIAL SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR OFFENDERS
 IN TEN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS*
 JOHN HAGAN ILENE H. NAGEL (BERNSTEIN)
 University of Wisconsin-Madison Indiana University
 University of Toronto
 CELESTA ALBONETTI
 Indiana University
 American Sociological Review 1980, Vol. 45 (October):802-820
 While sociologists have long debated the relationship between the status characteristics of
 criminal offenders and the sentences they receive, they have done so with data sets drawn from
 state courts whose prosecutorial resources are focused almost entirely on low status
 defendants. Qualitative and quantitative data analyzed in this paper are drawn from ten federal
 district courts whose statutes and resources provide greater potential for the prosecution of the
 white-collar crimes of higher status offenders. Three questions are addressed: (1) Are there
 substantial jurisdictional differences in the prosecution of white-collar cases? if so, (2) Are there
 corresponding jurisdictional differences in the sentencing of white-collar cases? and (3) Within
 jurisdictions, are there further differences in the factors that influence sentencing decisions in
 white-collar as compared to other kinds of cases? The data are analyzed from a perspective that
 emphasizes organizational considerations: we conceptualize the criminal justice process as a
 loosely coupled system and the use of prosecutorial resources as proactive and reactive. We
 argue that the expanded prosecution of white-collar persons for their white-collar crimes
 requires a proactive prosecutorial policy and a tightening of the coupling between plea
 negotiations and sentencing decisions in the prosecutorial and judicial subsystems. Our
 quantitative analysis reveals that one district follows a uniquely proactive pattern. As expected,
 this proactive district also exhibits a unique leniency in the sentencing of college educated
 white-collar criminals that is related to earlier plea and charging decisions. A rather different
 and unanticipated pattern of leniency is found in this district for less educated white-collar
 offenders. A conclusion of this study is that there may be an inverse relationship between the
 volume of white-collar prosecutions and the severity with which they are sentenced.
 The existence of systematic links be-
 tween the status characteristics of crimi-
 nal offenders and the sentences they re-
 ceive has been debated for some time (see
 Hagan, 1974). This debate is grounded in
 issues of theory and policy. For example,
 Chiricos and Waldo (1975) regard a re-
 lationship between class position and
 sentencing as crucial to one prominent
 version (Chambliss and Seidman, 1971) of
 a conflict theory of crime, while the ab-
 sence of such a relationship is usually
 deemed essential to notions of "equality
 before the law." It therefore is not sur-
 prising that this type of debate has gener-
 ated a large volume of research (see Net-
 tier, 1979:40-6). What is surprising is the
 inconclusiveness of the findings that flow
 from this work.
 The problem is not simply that these
 findings are inconsistent, although they
 are that. For all the studies that find little
 (e.g., Bernstein et al., 1977) or no (e.g.,
 Chiricos and Waldo, 1975) relationship
 between status characteristics and sen-
 tencing, there are still those that find this
 relationship to be substantial (e.g.,
 Swigert and Farrell, 1977; Lizotte, 1978).
 However, the larger issue is that the data
 sets on which these studies are based are
 widely thought to be inadequate. Specifi-
 cally, critics (e.g., Greenberg, 1977; Hop-
 kins, 1977; Reasons, 1977) note that the
 samples considered in these studies con-
 sist almost entirely of low status defend-
 ants, making this research mainly a matter
 of within- rather than between-class
 comparisons. Thus, while (to date) re-
 search of this type has focused on the
 sentencing of "traditional" or "common"
 * Direct all correspondence to: John Hagan; De-
 partment of Sociology; Erindale College; University
 of Toronto; Mississauga, Ontario L5L-1C6.
 Research reported in this paper was funded by the
 Crime and Delinquency section of the National In-
 stitute of Mental Health. The authors wish to thank
 the anonymous reviewers of this manuscript for their
 helpful comments.
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 crimes (e.g., murder, robbery, larceny,
 etc.), Hopkins (1977:177) points out that
 "The illegal activities of the middle and
 upper classes are typically such things as
 income tax evasion and, in the case of
 businessmen, price fixing, violation of
 pollution laws and misrepresentation in
 advertising."
 Three problems account for the failure
 of recent research to consider the latter
 kinds of crimes, which usually are desig-
 nated vaguely as "white-collar crimes."
 First, there is an uncertainty about what,
 and who, to study. The difficulty is that
 not all white-collar crimes (e.g., income
 tax violations) are committed by white-
 collar persons, and not all white-collar
 persons commit white-collar crimes (e.g.,
 the crimes of Patty Hearst). We respond
 to this problem in this paper by cross-
 classifying indicators of the status of the
 offender and the offense. This allows us to
 compare the prosecution and sentencing
 of the white-collar crimes of white-collar
 persons with the prosecution and sen-
 tencing of other offender-offense combi-
 nations (see later pages, herein, for further
 elaboration of this point). Second, the
 former kinds of white-collar crimes are
 prosecuted with their greatest frequency
 in the American federal courts. To date,
 most sociological research on sentencing
 has been done in the state courts. Third,
 much of the white-collar crime of white-
 collar persons is 'beyond incrimination"
 (Kennedy, 1970). That is, much of this
 white-collar "indiscretion" is handled in
 the civil courts, or not dealt with at all.
 However, this situation shows signs of
 change.
 Some U.S. Attorney offices recently
 have begun to take increased initiative in
 the prosecution of white-collar persons
 and their white-collar crimes. The quan-
 titative data analyzed in this paper consist
 of cases prosecuted and sentenced over a
 several-year period in ten federal district
 courts, including one of the first U.S. At-
 torney offices in this country reputed to
 have made the prosecution of white-collar
 cases a high priority; qualitative data, as
 well, were gathered through observations
 and interviews in these courts. The latter
 data are used first to ground the following
 discussion of "white-collar justice."
 THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF
 WHITE-COLLAR JUSTICE
 To understand the sanctioning of
 white-collar persons and their white-collar
 crimes we must consider the system in
 which this occurs. In this section, we de-
 velop a perspective for viewing the opera-
 tions of this system. The perspective we
 offer is derived from the work of others
 and from the interviews and observations
 gathered in site visits to the ten district
 courts. The districts and their principal
 cities are Eastern and Southern New York
 (Brooklyn and Manhattan), Northern Il-
 linois (Chicago), Eastern Pennsylvania
 (Philadelphia), Maryland (Baltimore),
 Northern Texas (Dallas), Western
 Missouri (Kansas City), Northern Georgia
 (Atlanta), Central California (Los
 Angeles), and Eastern Michigan (Detroit).
 During the site visits we observed ap-
 proximately 200 hours of court proceed-
 ings and conducted approximately 600
 hours of interviews with the following
 court personnel: 9 Chief Judges and 42
 Presiding Judges, 8 United States Attor-
 neys and 48 Assistant United States At-
 torneys, 14 Probation Officers, 15 Admin-
 istrators of Pre-Trial Services Agencies,
 31 Magistrates, and 10 Chiefs of Public
 Defender Offices.'
 Reiss (1971; 1974) conceptualizes the
 criminal justice system as a loosely ar-
 ticulated operating network of input-
 output relationships among a series of
 subsystems; a set of relationships that we
 1 These interviews were conducted over a ten-
 week period, with one week spent in each of the ten
 districts. The ten jurisdictions comprise a purposive
 sample selected by the Supreme Court (under
 provisions of the Speedy Trial Act; see fn. 4) and
 intended to maximize the representation of major
 metropolitan and geographic areas across the United
 States. The first two authors of this paper conducted
 the interviews together, using a set of structured,
 open-ended interview schedules that are available on
 request. Our purpose was to interview a cross-
 section of court personnel across the ten districts.
 Unedited excerpts from these interviews are quoted
 in this article. One Chief Judge refused to be inter-
 viewed and two U.S. Attorneys were not available
 for interviews. However, the First Assistant to each
 of the latter U.S. Attorneys was interviewed and our
 coverage otherwise was quite comprehensive. These
 qualitative data were generated to correspond to the
 quantitative data discussed later in this paper.
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 will refer to as a "loosely coupled sys-
 tem" (Hagan et al., 1979; see also Meyer
 and Rowan, 1977). Discretion is dispersed
 throughout this system, and mechanisms
 for systematizing this discretion appear to
 be the exception as much as the rule.
 Thus, Gibbs (1978: 105) observes that ". . .
 the system actually appears to be an
 ungoverned mishmash," and Eisenstein
 and Jacob (1977:37) note that even "the
 judge does not rule or govern; at most, he
 manages, and often he is managed by
 others." Reiss (1971:120) goes on to sug-
 gest that "the major means of control
 among the subsystems is internal to each"
 with the significant consequence that
 "each subsystem creates its own system
 of justice." This situation becomes prob-
 lematic when the attempt is made in such
 a system to establish or shift policies and
 priorities. Indeed, one of the fascinating
 features of loosely coupled systems is
 their ability to circumvent such changes
 (see Meyer and Rowan, 1977).
 Yet important changes in policies and
 priorities sometimes do occur, with sys-
 temwide repercussions. Within the crimi-
 nal justice system, such changes are often
 implemented through the prosecutorial
 subsystem. Reiss (1974:690) indicates why
 and how:
 By legal authority and by practice, prose-
 cutors have the greatest discretion in the
 formally organized criminal justice network.
 ... The way that prosecutors exercise dis-
 cretion over input and output varies consid-
 erably among jurisdictions. This variation is
 due partly to the organized forms of discre-
 tion available to a prosecutor in a given
 jurisdiction and partly to historical practice
 within that office. The discretionary deci-
 sions of prosecutors whether or not to file
 information can exercise substantial control
 over input into the system, while the quan-
 tity and quality of output are determined
 mainly by their decisions to nol pros or to
 plea bargain.
 Drawing from Reiss (1971), Black (1973)
 and our own interviews, we suggest that
 this prosecutorial power can be exercised
 in two principal ways.
 On the one hand, prosecutors can fol-
 low a reactive policy of law enforcement.
 Following this strategy, prosecutors can
 respond to police initiatives in the same
 way in which the police do to citizen com-
 plaints. That is, prosecutors can simply
 respond to what the police bring to their
 attention. Indeed, the influx of cases, the
 absence of ready avenues of diversion,
 and the scarcity of resources is such that
 most state courts can do little but react,
 and slowly at that. These are "courts of
 last resort." Many federal prosecutors
 also are reactive. Their assumption is
 often that court resources are most effi-
 ciently organized to satisfy the demands
 of enforcement agencies. This assumption
 is reflected in the explanation given us by
 a U.S. Attorney for his reluctance to pur-
 sue one type of white-collar crime.
 It would be nice to investigate, let's say,
 public corruption. "Okay, FBI, I want you
 to go out and develop snitches in all the
 HEW places where they might be taking
 bribes" . . . but God knows how much time
 [that would take] and we don't have the re-
 sources to do that. If I had some prosecutors
 or some agents to whom I could say, "Okay,
 I don't mind you wasting a year investigating
 this because we want it looked into," then I
 could see doing that. But if you don't have
 the resources to do it, I just don't feel you
 are using your resources right.
 This reactive view is summarized in a
 quote from .another U.S. Attorney inter-
 view: "In my opinion, any time you deny
 an agency the right to enforce its federal
 laws, you are not doing the job you are put
 here for."
 Other federal prosecutors find, in their
 roles, sources of flexibility that allow the
 development of proactive policies. First,
 federal prosecutors have jurisdiction over
 a broad range of white-collar offenses.
 Second, federal prosecutors can decline
 cases or defer them to state courts, re-
 serving resources for cases they assign
 higher priority. Third, the ratio of person-
 nel to cases is usually more favorable in
 federal than in state courts. Fourth, fed-
 eral prosecutors often have investigatory
 resources-particularly, federal agencies
 like the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
 the Postal Service and the Internal Reve-
 nue Service-that the state courts do not.
 Consequently, U.S. Attorney offices in
 several large jurisdictions allocate their
 resources to proactively initiate and en-
 courage the investigation and prosecution
 of high priority cases. Thus, one U.S.
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 Attorney interviewed noted that "In
 terms of the decision-making process of
 how and what cases will be handled and
 what will be done, a lot [of decisions] are
 being made here and not in the agency."
 One way this is done is as follows.
 The U.S. Attorney's office can investigate
 cases in the grand jury, where it generates
 information. In other words, we can initiate
 an investigation. What we do often is we
 initiate investigations and then bring in the
 agency that will have jurisdiction in that area
 and be working with that agency in terms of
 developing the grand jury investigation; but
 we are not limited to only acting on cases
 that come into the office after an agency has
 done an investigation. We ourselves can ini-
 tiate the investigation, through the grand
 jury.
 This proactive attitude is summarized in
 the observation of another U.S. Attorney
 that: "We don't sit back and wait for
 cases to walk in the door. We go out and
 make them."
 However, use of grand juries is not suf-
 ficient to build important white-collar
 cases in a proactive fashion. Information
 and evidence are needed to begin building
 these cases. While in other prosecutions
 such information frequently comes from
 victims and witnesses, the white-collar
 crimes of white-collar persons usually are
 different: the complexity and diffuseness
 of the victimizations reduce the visibility
 of these crimes and, therefore, the likeli-
 hood of obtaining evidence from nonim-
 plicated persons.2 A U.S. Attorney ex-
 plains the problem this way:
 ... in these sort of activities, the only
 people with the information that you are
 going to have to convict are the participants.
 It is not like a bank robbery where innocent
 people watch and see and identify. The only
 way you can get these kinds of criminals is
 through information supplied by partici-
 pants. You have to peel off the layers . ..
 and that is difficult. That is a burden that is
 tougher than the burden prosecutors in the
 past had to deal with.
 The questions that follow are What is
 the exact nature of this burden? and Why
 is this burden so difficult to bear? Our
 interviews suggest that the nature of the
 burden is negotiation: the development of
 cooperative witnesses through plea
 negotiation. The process- and problems in-
 volved are suggested in another segment
 of the above interview.
 The negotiation proceeds within the confines
 of reality. That is the advantage I think good
 defense counsel has. . . . He knows and can
 tell his client what is likely to happen, and
 how likely it is to happen. If we've got a
 weak case, we've got a weak hand. If you've
 got a really strong case, you hold four aces
 on the top and he doesn't have any choice.
 Well, he does have a choice. Some people
 just go down. They take their lumps and they
 don't want to talk.... One of the last chips
 we have is that we can say not only are we
 going to convict you and send you to prison
 and you aren't going to get anything. After
 that is all done, then we will put you in the
 grand jury and we will get the information
 anyway and you won't get any credit for it.
 Indeed at sentencing we will stand up and
 make a point of the fact that you refused to
 cooperate and that will be held against you
 and you will get even more time.
 The proactive prosecution of white-
 collar persons and their white-collar
 crimes, therefore, comes down to the
 problem of how to get the leverage re-
 quired to "turn witnesses," and the key to
 obtaining this leverage is to forge a con-
 nection between plea negotiations and
 concessions and coercion in sentencing.
 In other words, prosecutors must over-
 come the tendency toward loose coupling
 between most parts of the criminal justice
 system, establishing instead a direct con-
 nection between plea negotiations and
 sentencing decisions in white-collar cases.
 This can be accomplished in at least two
 ways: by carefully managing the severity
 of the charges in these cases, so that
 judges can use statutory guidelines in ar-
 riving at lenient sentences, and by getting
 judges to reward negotiated pleas directly.
 That such sentencing decisions are gener-
 ated is suggested by the following obser-
 vation of an Assistant U.S. Attorney in
 charge of a subsection responsible for the
 prosecution of official corruption in the
 district best known in our sample for its
 2 Beyond this, even when such evidence might be
 obtained through record searches, accounting pro-
 cedures, and the analysis of documents, the amounts
 of material and the methods of investigation are so
 costly in man-hours and resources, both to develop
 and to present in court, that such efforts rarely are
 undertaken.
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 early emphasis on white-collar crime: "I
 would say most judges understand that in
 order to expose official corruption you do
 have to give some concessions to people
 who are involved. Again, because only
 those people who are involved know and
 can testify about it."3 Depending on how
 extensive these understandings are, one
 implication of the connection we have
 drawn between negotiation and sentenc-
 ing will be an overall tendency toward the
 lenient sentencing of white-collar persons
 convicted of white-collar crimes. In the
 remainder of this paper we use our quan-
 titative data to examine evidence of this
 and related possibilities outlined in the
 perspective we have developed.
 THE PROSECUTION AND
 SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR
 CRIME IN TEN FEDERAL
 DISTRICT COURTS
 The quantitative data we will consider
 consist of 9,068 cases prosecuted, and
 6,562 cases sentenced, in our ten district
 courts over a period beginning in 1974 and
 ending in 1977. These data were collected
 by the administrative office of United
 States Courts, and our use of the data is
 premised on an agreement not to identify
 individual districts in our analysis.4 Be-
 fore beginning this analysis, we must
 specify our operationalization of the con-
 cept of white-collar crime.
 Although the term "white-collar crime"
 has gained currency in several languages
 and in popular thought, there is disagree-
 ment about its definition (see Geis and
 Meier, 1977). As indicated earlier, much
 of the problem involves the kinds of
 crimes and kinds of people involved. Our
 analysis is based on an operational defini-
 tion that allows consideration of both the
 offender and the offense. We began with a
 listing of all offenses in the United States
 3 The federal law itself can be an effective means
 toward this end. For example, the Mail Fraud Stat-
 ute and the Travel Act have been used with consid-
 erable "legal craftsmanship" to successfully prose-
 cute important white-collar cases (see Henderson,
 1977). An indication of the flexible way in which
 these statutes have been used to generate coopera-
 tion and achieve convictions is suggested by the fol-
 lowing rather sardonic excerpt from a dissenting ap-
 peal court opinion. This appeal resulted from the
 successful prosecution (during the period of our
 study in what we later identify as a very proactive
 district) of a major bribery case.
 I conclude by depicting a scenario which I have
 little doubt approximates the facts of this prosecu-
 tion. Federal officials, getting wind of a deal be-
 tween . . . state legislators and the . . . industry,
 assign agents to investigate. In due course, immu-
 nity is promised to some of the involved legislators
 and company officials in return for their coopera-
 tion and testimony. Recording devices are placed
 on some of the immunized persons to obtain incul-
 pating admissions from those who are the targets
 of the prosecution. Once the investigation is com-
 pleted, consideration is then given to what federal
 offense, if any, has been committed. The Mail
 Fraud Statute? The Federal Travel Act? The in-
 vestigation files are searched to find some mailings
 or evidence of interstate travel. The United States
 Attorney's office sifts through the mailings in the
 file and then constructs a legal theory in order that
 they may be used to form the basis for a charge of
 mail fraud. One fortuitous trip, totally incidental
 and unforeseen, by an unindicted coschemer
 forms the basis of the two travel-act counts. A
 conspiracy count is, of course, added. In this
 fashion, the Mail Fraud Statute and the Travel Act
 are subverted to purposes for which they were
 never intended. No longer are the mailings and
 travel considered essential or an integral part of
 the scheme; they are seen and used to obtain fed-
 eral jurisdiction.
 In the above case, the central "unindicted co-
 schemer" was separately charged with one count of
 making a false statement on his Income Tax return
 (that is, the bribe), to which he pleaded guilty. The
 statutory maximum sentence for the latter offense
 was three years imprisonment, and this offender re-
 ceived one year on probation. The other legislators
 in this case were charged with mail fraud, conspir-
 acy, and travel-act violations, exposing them to
 potential concurrent sentencing and a statutory
 maximum sentence of five years imprisonment on
 one count of mail fraud alone. All pleaded not guilty;
 one was acquitted, while the others received three-
 year prison sentences and fines. A remaining group
 of corporate executives was charged with the same
 offenses, pleaded guilty, and received one to two
 years' probation and fines. This case usefully illus-
 trates the important role which plea and charge
 negotiation can play in a proactive district in the
 prosecution and sentencing of important white-collar
 cases.
 4 These data were collected with special
 provisions for quality control and comprehensive-
 ness made possible through a mandate of the Speedy
 Trial Act of 1974 to evaluate the experimental bail
 reform program established under this Act. All but
 88 cases (which came into the data set in 1974) are
 from the years 1975 through 1977. The provisions of
 the evaluation were that a population of cases was to
 be collected during this period. Our interviews in all
 ten districts indicated full cooperation in the fulfill-
 ment of this mandate.
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 Code that could plausibly be thought of as
 white-collar crimes.5 We then refined this
 classification by asking U.S. Attorneys in
 the ten districts to approve or disapprove
 of the inclusion of offenses, asking each to
 identify offense codes that were almost
 always white-collar, sometimes white-
 collar, and almost never white-collar.
 Thirty-one offenses that elicited consider-
 able consensus as white-collar crimes
 were retained,6 and, for the purposes of
 this research, the other offenses were
 designated as common crimes. We pro-
 ceeded by cross-classifying the dichotomy
 with two dichotomized measures of the
 offender's social standing: education (high
 school or less, and college or more) and
 income (less than $13,777, and $13,777 or
 more, per year, in 1974-1977 dollars).
 These are the most direct measures of so-
 cial standing available in our data, and we
 have dichotomized them on the basis of
 Featherman and Hauser's (1978) recent
 replication of the work of Blau and Dun-
 can (1967). Thus, our cut points corre-
 spond to the highest grouping of occupa-
 tions considered in these studies.
 Analyses reported in this paper have been
 done separately for the education and in-
 come measures, with, as we will see par-
 tially in Table 1, substantially similar re-
 sults. However, in deference to space
 limitations, we present only the results in-
 volving education beyond Table 1. Edu-
 cation was selected over income for two
 reasons: it allows us to consider women
 without reported incomes in a more
 meaningful manner, and it avoids the
 problem of correcting for a deflating dollar
 over the several-year period. The result-
 ing cross-classification that forms a cen-
 tral part of our analysis includes the fol-
 lowing four kinds of cases: the common
 crimes of the less educated; the common
 crimes of the college educated; the
 white-collar crimes of the less educated;
 and the white-collar crimes of the college
 educated. As indicated earlier, the latter
 type of case is of greatest interest to us
 because it is the "purest" form of white-
 collar crime we can identify and because
 we expect prosecution of this type of case
 to exhibit the most interesting variation
 across districts.
 The first step in our analysis was to
 examine the distribution of prosecutions
 and dispositions for the four offender-
 offense combinations in all ten districts.
 What we found was a striking similarity in
 these distributions for nine of the ten dis-
 tricts. The tenth, which we call District C,
 s The original listing was made available to the
 authors by Stanton Wheeler and John Cardascia and
 consists of 53 offenses abstracted from the Code.
 6 A short description follows of 27 of these of-
 fenses, with the Title number, Section number, and
 number of cases involving a college educated of-
 fender indicated in parentheses: trust, etc., in re-
 straint of trade (15:1:51); bankruptcy-concealment
 of assets, false oaths and claims, bribery (18:152:1);
 bribery, graft, and conflicts of interest-bribery of
 public officials and witnesses (18:201:5); bribery,
 graft, and conflict of interest-salary of government
 officials and employees payable only by U.S.
 (18:209:1); bribery, graft, and conflict of interest-
 offer to procure appointed public office (18:210:1);
 claims and services in matters that affect
 government-conspiracy to defraud the government
 in respect to claims (18:286:1); claims and services in
 matters that affect the government-false or fraudu-
 lent claims (18:287:12); embezzlement and theft-
 accounting for public money (18:643:1); embezzle-
 ment and theft-custodians generally misusing pub-
 lic funds (18:648:1); embezzlement and theft-theft,
 embezzlement or misapplication by bank officers or
 employees (18:656:57); embezzlement and theft-
 lending, credit, and insurance institutions (18:657:6);
 embezzlement and theft-property mortgaged or
 pledged to farm credit agencies (18:658:1); embez-
 zlement and theft-theft or embezzlement from em-
 ployee benefit plan (18:664:1); fraud and false
 statements-statements or entries generally
 (18:1001:23); fraud and false statements-bank en-
 tries, reports, or false transactions (18:1005:2); fraud
 and false statements-federal crime institutions en-
 tries, reports, and transactions (18:1006:1); fraud and
 false statements-Department of Housing and Urban
 Development and Federal Housing Administration
 transactions (18:1010:2); fraud and false
 statements-Department of Housing and Urban De-
 velopment transactions (18:1012:1); fraud and false
 statements-loan and credit applications generally,
 also renewals and discounts, crop insurance
 (18:1014:14); mail fraud-frauds and swindles
 (18:1341:56); mail fraud-fictitious name or address
 (18:1342:2); mail fraud-fraud by wire, radio, or
 telephone (18:1343:6); attempt to evade or defeat tax
 (26:7201:11); failing to file tax return (26:7203:28);
 fraud and false statements (26:7206:23); fiduciary re-
 sponsibility of officers of labor organizations
 (29:501:1); fraudulent acceptance of payments-
 veteran's benefit (38:3502:6). Four additional of-
 fenses (18:2073; 26:7207; 26:7262; 49:322) were des-
 ignated as white-collar by U.S. Attorneys in our
 interviews. However, these offenses did not result in
 convictions for college educated offenders in our
 data.
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 Table 1. Prosecutions and Dispositions for Offender-Offense Combinations in District C and Other Dis-
 tricts*
 District C Other Districts
 Prosecutions
 Education Education
 Crime High School College High School College
 Common 83.9o 16.1% 83.3% 16.7%
 Crime 86.3% 56.7% 79.6% 91.6% 80.5% 89.5%
 66.7% 12.8% 74.6% 15.0o
 (598) (115) (713) (6094) (1222) (7316)
 White- 5 1.9o 48.1% 64.4% 34.6%
 Collar 13.7% 43.3% 20.4% 8.4% 19.5% 10.4
 Crime 10.6% 9.8% 6.5% 3.6%
 (95) (88) (183) (560) (296) (856)
 Convictions
 Education Education
 Crime High School College High School College
 Common 83.7% 16.3% 83.9o 16.1%
 Crime 84.1% 51.5% 76.2% 90.7% 78.2% 88.4%
 63.8% 12.4% 74.2% 14.3%
 (443) _ (86) (529) _ (4352) _ (838) (5190)
 X sentence = 8.04 X sentence = 5.60 X sentence = 7.35 X sentence = 6.59
 White 50.9% 49.1% 65.6% 34.4%
 Collar 15.9% 48.5% 23.8% 9.3% 21.8% 11.6%
 Crime 12.1% 11.7% 7.6% 4.0%
 (84) _ (81) (165) _ (445) _ (233) (678)
 X sentence = 4.13 X sentence = 3.49 X sentence = 4.43 X sentence = 4.64
 Convictions
 Income (1974-1977 $) Income (1974-1977 $)
 Crime 13,776- 13,777+ 13,776- 13,777+
 Common 89.8% 10.2% 92.9% 7.1%
 Crime 85.4% 39.1% 76.2% 90.0% 72.3% 88.4%
 68.4% 7.8% 82.1 6.3%
 (475) _ (54) (529) _ (4,819) _ (371) (5,190)
 X sentence = 7.60 X sentence = 8.11 X sentence = 7.31 X sentence = 6.18
 White 49.1% 50.9% 79.1% 20.9%
 Collar 14.6% 60.9o 23.8% 10.0% 27.6% 11.6%
 Crime 11.7% 12.1% 9.1% 2.4%
 (81) _ (84) (165) _ (536) (142) (678)
 X sentence = 4.10 X sentence 3.55 X sentence = 4.38 X sentence = 4.98
 * Each cell of each cross-classification is percentaged first by row, second by column, and third in relation
 to the full cross-classification.
 was distinguished by its disproportionate
 prosecution of white-collar persons in-
 volved in white-collar crimes. Table 1 pre-
 sents the distribution of prosecutions and
 dispositions, by offender and offense, in
 District C as compared to the other nine
 districts.
 Table 1 reveals that while 9.8% of the
 prosecutions and 11.7% of the convictions
 in District C include college educated per-
 sons involved in white-collar crimes, the
 respective figures for the remaining dis-
 tricts are 3.6% (ranging from 2.7% to
 4.5%) and 4% (ranging from 2.4% to
 5.4%). When income is used as the mea-
 sure of social standing in Table 1, the dis-
 parity in convictions between District C
 and the other districts increases slightly to
 12.1% as compared with 2.4%. At a mini-
 mum, then, District C prosecutes and
 convicts more than twice the propor-
 tionate number of white-collar persons for
 white-collar crimes as do the other dis-
 tricts. Thus, although the caseloads of
 none of the districts are overcrowded with
 the latter types of cases, both in prose-
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 cutions and convictions, District C is
 clearly the deviant case. Yet another way
 of making this point is to indicate that,
 while District C prosecutes only 9.9o of
 the cases handled in all ten districts, it
 prosecutes 22.9% of the white-collar cases
 involving college educated persons. The
 respective conviction figures are 10.6%
 and 25.8%, and 10.6% and 37.1% when
 income replaces education as the measure
 of social standing. These data suggest that
 whether education or income is used as
 the measure of social standing, District C
 has followed a uniquely proactive pattern
 in its prosecution of white-collar crime.7
 Returning to Table 1, we should also
 note that in none of the districts does the
 prosecution of white-collar crime pre-
 dominately involve what might con-
 ventionally be regarded as white-collar
 persons. Approximately half of the
 white-collar crimes prosecuted (48.1%)
 and convicted (49.1%) in District C in-
 volve college educated persons, compared
 to about one-third in the other districts
 (34.6%; 34.4%). A similar pattern prevails
 in the part of Table 1 that replaces educa-
 tion with income. Thus, although District
 C again demonstrates a more proactive
 emphasis on the white-collar crimes of
 white-collar persons, this emphasis is by
 no means exclusive. This finding is con-
 sistent with the observation of Katz
 (1979:433) that "There are relatively few
 crimes that can be committed only by
 those in white-collar occupations" and the
 observation of Geis (1974:284) that "white
 collar crimes can be committed by per-
 sons in all social classes." Federal prose-
 cutors not only believe, but also act on,
 this assumption-pursuing, for example,
 large numbers of bank clerks for small-
 scale embezzlements and less educated
 citizens for relatively small-scale income
 tax violations (see Long, 1979). The other
 side of this situation is that college edu-
 cated persons, also, of course, are prose-
 cuted and convicted for common crimes.
 In fact, there is rather striking consistency
 in the finding that approximately 16% of
 the prosecutions as well as of convictions
 for common crimes, in District C as well
 as in other districts, involve college edu-
 cated persons. Although the figures for
 income are smaller (10.2% and 7.1%),
 there is consistency here as well. This
 consistency is in contrast to the variation
 we find in the prosecution and conviction
 of white-collar persons involved in
 white-collar crimes.
 We have also included in Table 1 mean
 sentence scores (see Table 2 for the scale
 used) for the various offender-offense
 groupings. Several things are apparent in
 these figures.
 First, although there is a general tend-
 ency across districts for white-collar
 crimes to result in lighter sentences than
 common crimes, the disparities involved
 are greater in District C than in the other
 districts.
 Second, in District C, whether educa-
 tion or income is the measure of social
 standing, white-collar persons prosecuted
 for white-collar crimes receive the most
 lenient sentences. (By contrast, in the
 other districts, the lightest mean sen-
 tences are received by less educated and
 lower income persons prosecuted for
 white-collar crimes.)
 Third, with the exception of instances
 when income is considered in District C,
 the common crimes of common criminals
 result in the most severe sentences.
 Fourth, the largest disparity in mean
 sentences reported in Table 1 is within
 District C, and it involves the common
 crimes of the less educated (X = 8.04) and
 the white-collar crimes of the college edu-
 cated (X = 3.49).
 Fifth, when comparisons are made be-
 tween the same offender-offense group-
 ings in District C and the remaining dis-
 tricts, the most consistent disparity ob-
 served across the districts is in the mean
 sentences received by college educated
 7 District C is uniquely proactive in the sense that,
 by the measures applied, it is the most proactive
 district in our data. This said, we should also note
 that while the volume of white-collar cases prose-
 cuted and convicted in District C is not dramatic, the
 reallocation of resources required to pursue even this
 number of cases is probably substantial. Our point is
 simply that white-collar cases require a dispropor-
 tionate investment of resources and that, therefore,
 the doubling of the proportionate number of prose-
 cutions and convictions (albeit still not large) in Dis-
 trict C is probably a more dramatic difference than it
 might otherwise seem. This point is addressed again,
 in a somewhat different way, in the conclusion to this
 article.
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 white-collar criminals (X = 3.49 and 4.64)
 and high income white-collar criminals (X
 = 3.55 and 4.98). A possible implication of
 these findings, consistent with the per-
 spective outlined earlier in this paper, is
 that the proactive prosecution of white-
 collar crime in District C results in more
 lenient sentencing, particularly for white-
 collar persons. However, before in-
 ferences are drawn from these findings, it
 is necessary to consider a number of other
 relevant variables. We do this in the mul-
 tivariate analyses presented in following
 sections of this article.
 Finally, although we might have ex-
 pected more variation across districts in
 our data, we should note that the unique
 position of District C is not surprising.
 This is the District in our data set that is
 best known for its early emphasis on the
 prosecution of white-collar crime. This
 tradition was established most visibly by a
 U.S. Attorney who made the proactive
 pursuit of white-collar crime and political
 corruption a focal point of his work. The
 impression formed in our interviews, in
 the public statements of officials in the
 Department of Justice, and in recent
 highly publicized cases being pursued in
 the federal courts is that this is a style of
 administration that is going to become
 more prominent in the federal system.
 Thus, the following comparative analysis
 of sentencing patterns in District C and
 the other nine districts may be important
 to not only the debate on status charac-
 teristics and sentencing but to our under-
 standing of the shape of things to come, as
 well.
 METHODS AND MEASUREMENT
 Table 2 presents the variables and their
 codings to be considered in this analysis.
 Variables are included on the basis of the
 perspective outlined above, prior research
 (e.g., Hagan, 1974; Chiricos and Waldo,
 1975; Burke and Turk, 1975; Bernstein et
 al., 1977; Nagel, 1980; Swigert and Far-
 rell, 1977), concerns for multicollinearity,
 and suggestions arising from our inter-
 views. Thus, we began with a traditional
 list of variables that includes prior adult
 felony convictions, statutory seriousness
 of the offense, number of charges for
 which the defendant was convicted,
 ethnicity, sex, age, and employment
 status; then, we added to these consid-
 eration of whether or not the defendant
 was undergoing treatment for physical
 and/or mental illness. Our interviews sug-
 gested that the latter two variables might
 be particularly relevant for white-collar
 defendants. In addition, our sensitivity to
 the impact of prior processing decisions
 on sentencing suggested the inclusion of
 bail status (ordinally ranked on the basis
 of our interviews and on an evaluation of
 the fiscal and personal constraints in-
 volved), whether the defendant pleaded
 guilty, and a consideration of charge re-
 ductions. Since multiple defendants are
 common in white-collar cases, we also in-
 cluded a measure of their presence in our
 analysis. Several of the variables intro-
 duced thus far have particular significance
 for this study and are discussed further,
 here.
 For example, statutory seriousness is
 an important variable to the perspective
 developed in this paper. This variable is
 measured in terms of the maximum prison
 sentence provided in the United States
 Code for the charge initially placed against
 the offender (charge reductions are con-
 sidered below). Since white-collar crimes
 generally are assumed to carry lower stat-
 utory maximums then common crimes,8
 and because prosecutors can also use their
 discretion in selecting the statutory seri-
 ousness of the charge, the statutory seri-
 ousness variable may be expected to form
 a particularly important link in the prose-
 cution and sentencing of white-collar per-
 sons for white-collar crimes.
 From the perspective on white-collar
 crime outlined earlier, the offender's plea
 is also expected to be a very significant
 link between prosecution and sentencing.
 At minimum, a guilty plea in such a case
 saves the resources otherwise required to
 establish guilt in court. Since important
 white-collar cases are characteristically
 complex, this is often a considerable sav-
 ings. Beyond this, many guilty pleas in-
 8 Consistent with this assumption, there is a cor-
 relation of- .14 in our data between statutory seri-
 ousness and those white-collar crimes involving col-
 lege educated persons.
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 Table 2. Variables, Values, and Descriptive Statistics
 Adjusted
 Variables Values X s N %
 Prior Convictions Actual Number of Adult Felony Convictions .99 2.05
 Statutory Maximum Sentence Allowed by Statute
 Seriousness 7.74 5.81
 Number of Actual Number
 Charges 2.11 1.91
 Multiple No = -1
 Defendants -.47 .88 4821 (73.5)
 Yes= 1 1741 (26.5)
 Ethnicity Nonwhite = -1 -.03 .99 3379 (51.5)
 White = 1 3183 (48.5)
 Sex Male = - 1 -.68 .73 5509 (84)
 Female = 1 1053 (16)
 Employment Unemployed= - 1 .01 1.00 3238 (49.3)
 Employed = 1 3324 (50.7)
 Physical Illness Not Under Treatment = -1 -.62 .79 5307 (80.9)
 Under Treatment = 1 1255 (19.1)
 Mental Illness Not Under Psychiatric Treatment = -1 -.94 .35 6359 (96.9)
 Under Psychiatric Treatment = 1 203 (3.1)
 Age 17= 1 2.33 .72 13 (.2)
 18-37 = 2 4797 (73.1)
 38-46 = 3 984 (15.0)
 47-59 = 4 659 (10.0)
 60+ = 5 16 (.2)
 Bail Status 4.29 3.00
 Personal Recognizance = 1 1337 (20.5)
 Unsecured Bond = 2 844 (12.9)
 Unsecured Bond plus supervision or other
 conditions of bail = 3 1670 (25.6)
 10% Cash deposit = 4 290 (4.4)
 10% Cash deposit plus supervision or other
 condition of bail = 5 410 (6.3)
 Collateral = 6 17 (.3)
 Collateral plus supervision or other conditions
 of bail = 7 33 (.5)
 Surety Bond = 8 1099 (16.8)
 Surety Bond plus supervision or other condi-
 tion of bail = 9 706 (10.8)
 Remand = 10 128 (2.0)
 Plea Pleaded Not Guilty = -1 .76 .66 802 (12.2)
 Pleaded Guilty = 1 5760 (87.8)
 Charge Reduction Petty Offense to Felony = -3 .50 1.21 15 (.2)
 Misdemeanor to Felony = -2 309 (4.7)
 Petty Offense to Misdemeanor = -1 0 0
 No Change = 0 4522 (69.0)
 Misdemeanor to Petty Offense = 1 189 (2.9)
 Felony to Misdemeanor = 2 798 (12.2)
 Felony to Petty Offense = 3 723 (11.0)
 College Educated Dummy Variable with Less Educated Com-
 White-Collar mon Criminals as Reference Category
 Criminals .048 .213 314 (4.8)
 Less Educated Dummy Variable with Less Educated Com-
 White Collar mon Criminals as Reference Category
 Criminals .081 .272 529 (8.1)
 College Educated Dummy Variable with Less Educated Com-
 Common Criminals mon Criminals as Reference Category .14 .348 924 (14.1)
 Income 0-$13,776 1.099 .299 5911 (90.1)
 $13,777+ 651 (9.9)
This content downloaded from 156.56.168.2 on Wed, 09 Mar 2016 18:49:59 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 812 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
 Table 2. Continued
 Adjusted
 Variables Values X s N %
 Sentence Severity Suspended Sentence or Probation w/o Super-
 vision = 0 6.90 6.24 158 2.4
 Fine and/or Restitution = 1 143 2.2
 Probation or Probation plus fine and/or Res-
 titution 1-12 months = 2 518 7.9
 Probation or Probation plus fine and/or Res-
 titution 13-36 months = 3 1678 25.6
 Incarcerated in Custody of Attorney General
 1-6 months or Incarcerated in Custody of
 Attorney-General 1-6 months plus fine
 and/or Restitution or Probation or Proba-
 tion plus fine and/or Restitution 37 months
 or more = 4 876 13.3
 Split Sentence or Split Sentence plus fine
 and/or Restitution (6 months or less) = 5 751 11.4
 Incarcerated in Custody of Attorney General
 7-12 months or Incarcerated in Custody of
 Attorney General 7-12 months plus fine
 and/or Restitution = 6 205 3.1
 Mixed Sentence 6-12 months = 7 139 2.1
 Incarcerated in Custody of Attorney General
 13-24 months or Incarcerated in Custody of
 Attorney General 13-24 months plus fine
 and/or Restitution = 8 437 6.7
 Mixed Sentence 13-24 months = 9 61 .9
 Incarcerated in Custody of Attorney General
 25-36 months or Incarcerated in Custody of
 Attorney General 25-36 months plus fine
 and/or Restitution = 10 394 6.0
 Mixed Sentence 25-36 months = 11 37 .6
 Incarcerated in Custody of Attorney General
 37-48 months or Incarcerated in Custody of
 Attorney General 37-48 months plus fine
 and/or Restitution = 12 194 3.0
 Mixed Sentence 37 months or more = 13 51 .8
 Incarcerated in Custody of Attorney General
 49-60 months or Incarcerated in Custody of
 Attorney General 49-60 months plus fine
 and/or Restitution = 14 249 3.8
 Incarcerated in Custody of Attorney General
 61-84 months or Incarcerated in Custody of
 Attorney General 61-84 months plus fine
 and/or Restitution = 17 265 4.0
 Incarcerated in Custody of Attorney General
 85-120 months with or without fine and/or
 Restitution = 21
 Incarcerated in Custody of Attorney General 219 3.3
 120 months or more or Incarcerated in
 Custody of Attorney General 120 months or
 more plus fine and/or Restitution = 30 187 2.8
 volve the cooperation of the offender in
 building a case against others. Thus, in
 these types of white-collar cases, we ex-
 pect the plea entered to have a notable
 effect on the sentence imposed-
 particularly in a district where the prose-
 cution of a large number of these cases is
 made a priority. This coupling between
 prosecutorial and judicial subsystems may
 be an important source of the differential
 sentencing of white-collar offenders. In
 this data set, guilty pleas are coded 1,
 pleas of innocence- 1.
 Charge reductions may also influence
 sentence severity, as a way of rewarding
 cooperation in white-collar cases. Charge
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 reductions are coded from- 3 to 3 in terms
 of all six possible movements up and
 down in severity among petty offense,
 misdemeanor, and felony. No change is
 coded 0. However, it should be noted that
 the possibilities for charge reductions in
 the federal courts are not as great as in the
 state courts:
 The reason for this difference is that state
 criminal codes include lesser offenses to
 which charges frequently can be reduced,
 whereas the federal criminal code typically
 does not. . . . A result is more explicit re-
 course to discussions of sentencing and re-
 lated sanctions. (Hagan and Bernstein.
 1979:470)
 The implication is that in the federal sys-
 tem the plea itself may be a more potent
 variable than the charge reduction.
 The next three variables in Table 2 in-
 volve the offender and offense compo-
 nents of white-collar crime. The three
 variables considered derive from a
 dummy coding (see Kerlinger and
 Pedhazur, 1973) of our earlier cross-
 classification of the offender's education
 and offense. Each of these variables,
 when included in the regression analyses
 that follow, yield a coefficient that repre-
 sents the difference in sentence for cases
 classified as the specified offender-offense
 grouping compared to those that are
 classified as a designated "reference cate-
 gory." For the purposes of our analyses,
 we have designated the common crimes of
 less educated persons as our reference
 category. This will allow us to estimate an
 effect parameter for each of our
 offender-offense groupings, compared to
 the reference category, with all other vari-
 ables in the regression equation taken into
 account. As an example, we will be able to
 examine whether the disparity-observed
 earlier in the sentences received by col-
 lege educated white-collar criminals, as
 compared to less educated common
 criminals-persists when the other inde-
 pendent variables just discussed are taken
 into account.
 The last variable in Table 2, sentence
 severity, is our dependent variable. The
 coding of this variable derives from the
 efforts of Tiffany et al. (1975) to devise an
 approximate interval scale of the severity
 of different sentencing options. Minimal
 revisions in this scale derive from our
 interviews and are intended to reflect
 further gradations in the severity of sen-
 tences imposed.
 Our analysis of the variables described
 above is based on conventional regression
 procedures. The strategy followed is to
 focus first on District C, in comparison to
 all other districts. Our purpose is to ex-
 amine comparatively the consequences of
 the proactive prosecution of white-collar
 crime in District C. The perspective de-
 veloped earlier suggests that the proactive
 prosecution of white-collar persons for
 their white-collar crimes requires conces-
 sions in sentencing, and it is this possibil-
 ity that we first consider. We then go on to
 examine more specifically the factors
 leading to severe or lenient sentencing for
 each of the four offender-offense combi-
 nations in District C, as compared to the
 other nine districts. This second phase of
 the analysis explores which of the other
 independent variables may contribute to
 the expected differential sentencing of
 white-collar offenders in District C, as
 compared to the other districts. The per-
 spective developed earlier suggests that
 concessions in the sentencing of these
 cases may follow from lenient initial
 charges, the rewarding of guilty pleas,
 and, possibly, charge reductions. These
 are the factors judged important in tight-
 ening the connection between the prose-
 cutorial and judicial subsystems, thereby
 circumventing the obstacles posed to pro-
 active prosecution in a loosely coupled
 system. Furthermore, if this tightening of
 connections between the prosecutorial
 and judicial subsystems does occur, we
 should also expect an increase in our
 ability to explain sentencing decisions in
 these types of cases-a consequence of a
 recognized common goal in a system
 otherwise characterized by divergent sub-
 system concerns. We also examine these
 expectations in the second phase of our
 analysis.
 We should note that all comparisons
 undertaken in the remainder of this article
 effectively involve populations or sub-
 populations. That is, we are not dealing
 with samples, but, rather, with the full
 volume of cases involved in any given
 comparison (see footnote 4). Nonetheless,
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 we report tests of significance in the tables
 that follow. These tests can be interpreted
 as checks on other kinds of random errors
 (for example, random measurement
 error). Our approach is to consider effects
 statistically significant at the .05 level and
 better, with betas larger than .10. Al-
 though there has been some debate as to
 whether standardized or unstandardized
 regression coefficients are more appropri-
 ate for the types of comparisons made in
 this paper, the more recent judgment is
 that both have their place (Hargens, 1976).
 Therefore, both coefficients are reported
 in our tables. However, there are some
 instances where unstandardized coeffi-
 cients will be more suitable for our pur-
 poses. For example, the standardization
 of dummy variable coefficients can be
 misleading, particularly when the distri-
 butions of these variables are skewed
 (Cohen and Cohen, 1975:184). Therefore,
 where dummy variables are involved, un-
 standardized coefficients will be empha-
 sized in the analysis that follows.
 THE ANALYSIS
 The results of the first part of our
 analysis are presented in Table 3. This
 table reports the results of regressing
 sentence severity on our independent
 variables separately in District C, the pro-
 active district, and in the remaining dis-
 tricts. Our primary interest in these re-
 gressions is to see if-other variables held
 constant-the sentencing of white-collar
 persons for their white-collar crimes var-
 ies among these districts. The results pre-
 sented in Table III indicate that this group
 is indeed sentenced differently in District
 C than in the remaining districts. A com-
 parison of unstandardized regression
 coefficients reveals that while in the re-
 maining districts college educated white-
 collar criminals do not receive signifi-
 cantly more lenient sentences than the
 reference category (less educated com-
 mon criminals), in District C the former
 group does receive sentences that in com-
 parison to the latter group are nearly three
 points lower (r = -.21; b = -2.72; B =
 -.16) on the sentence severity scale.
 However, what we did not anticipate is
 that less educated white-collar criminals
 experience a nearly identical leniency (r =
 -.18; b = -2.70; B = -.16) in District C
 that, again, is not paralleled in the re-
 maining districts. College and less edu-
 cated common criminals are not dramat-
 ically differentiated in the sentences they
 receive in either District C or the remain-
 ing districts. Overall, then, Table 3
 provides provisional support for the per-
 spective we have proposed: with a variety
 of other important variables held con-
 stant, our proactive distirct does grant le-
 nient sentences to college educated
 Table 3. Regression of Sentence Severity on Independent Variables in District C and Remaining Districts
 District C Remaining districts
 (N=694) (N=5868)
 Independent Variables r b B S. r b B S
 Prior Convictions .23 .45 .14 .000 .23 .36 .12 .000
 Statutory Seriousness .19 .04 .05 NS .29 .25 .22 .000
 Number of Charges -.02 .11 .04 NS .07 .23 .07 .000
 Multiple Defendants - .03 .25 .04 NS .10 .47 .06 .000
 Ethnicity -.04 .30 .05 NS -.08 -.42 -.07 .000
 Sex -.10 -.50 -.05 .100 -.17 -.82 -.10 .000
 Employment -.25 -.60 -.12 .001 -.15 -.50 -.08 .000
 Physical Illness .08 .34 .05 NS -.02 -.07 -.01 .000
 Mental Illness .04 .55 .04 NS -.01 -.15 -.01 NS
 Age -.02 .25 .04 NS -.03 -.07 -.01 NS
 Bail Status .37 .68 .28 .000 .50 .80 .37 .000
 Plea -.20 -1.02 -.13 .000 -.14 -.68 -.07 .000
 Charge Reduction .21 .58 .12 .001 .10 .15 .03 .009
 College Educated White-Collar Criminals - .21 -2.72 - .16 .000 - .07 .34 .01 NS
 Less Educated White-Collar Criminals - .18 -2.70 -.16 .000 - .11 .46 .02 .10
 College Educated Common Criminals -.08 -.15 -.09 .009 -.02 -.12 -.01 .000
 R2 =.298 R2=.326
 Intercept=4.65 Intercept= -.80
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 Table 4. Regression of Sentence Severity on Independent Variables for Offender-Offense Combinations in
 District C
 Less Educated College Educated
 Less Educated White-Collar College Educated White-Collar
 Common Criminals Criminals Common Criminals Criminals
 (N=443) (N=84) (N=86) (N=81)
 Independent Variables b B s b B s b B s b B s
 Prior Convictions .55 .15 .001 .21 .20 .086 .15 .07 NS -.07 -.02 NS
 Statutory Seriousness .01 .01 NS .07 .09 NS .36 .39 .004 .48 .42 .003
 Number of Charges -.01 -.01 NS .06 .10 NS .25 .17 NS -.05 -.06 NS
 Multiple Defendants .43 .07 NS -.24 -.14 NS .14 .03 NS -.41 -.18 NS
 Ethnicity .50 .08 .07 -.29 -.18 NS -.37 -.09 NS .14 .04 NS
 Sex -.68 -.06 NS -.03 -.02 NS -.46 -.07 NS -.42 -.08 NS
 Employment - .78 - .13 .003 - .48 - .24 .043 .33 .07 NS - .06 - .02 NS
 Physical Illness .71 .09 .05 -.01 -.01 NS -.48 -.08 NS .16 .05 NS
 Mental Illness .22 .01 NS .93 .27 .024 1.46 .14 NS .36 .07 NS
 Age .19 .02 NS .28 .17 NS .15 .03 NS -.01 -.01 NS
 Bail Status .96 .34 .000 .05 .09 NS .53 .24 .07 .15 .13 NS
 Plea -.84 -.10 .016 -.26 -.07 NS -.88 -.13 NS -1.26 -.24 .028
 Charge Reduction .72 .13 .002 .11 .08 NS -.42 -.09 NS .48 .16 NS
 R2=.27 R2 =.25 R2=.28 R2=.39
 Intercept= 3.88 Intercept= 3.85 Intercept=2.30 Intercept=3.27
 white-collar criminals, while the remain-
 ing districts do not. However, this same
 pattern is apparent for less educated
 white-collar criminals. Thus, the issue
 that remains is whether these two
 offender-offense groupings actually differ
 in ways consistent with the perspective
 we have proposed. This issue is pursued
 in the next phase of our analysis.
 Tables 4 and 5 present the results of
 regressing sentence severity on our inde-
 pendent variables within each of the four
 offender-offense groupings, first in Dis-
 trict C, then in the remaining districts. We
 note first in these tables that, consistent
 with the perspective outlined earlier, the
 highest explained variance involves the
 sentencing of college educated white-
 collar offenders in District C (R2 = .39).
 We take this as one indication of a tight-
 ening of connections in an otherwise
 loosely coupled system. Beyond this,
 however, we are anxious to determine
 where such a tightening in subsystem op-
 Table 5. Regression of Sentence Severity on Independent Variables for Offender-Offense Combinations in
 Remaining Districts
 Less Educated College Educated
 Less Educated White-Collar College Educated White-Collar
 Common Criminals Criminals Common Criminals Criminals
 (N=4352) (N=445) (N=838) (N=233)
 Independent Variables b B s b B s b B s b B s
 Prior Convictions .34 .11 .000 .29 .11 .013 .59 .18 .000 .39 .21 .001
 Statutory Seriousness .24 .22 .000 .04 -.03 NS .29 .23 .000 .04 .02 NS
 Number of Charges .30 .08 .000 .14 .15 .001 .17 .05 .058 .15 .14 .017
 Multiple Defendants .51 .07 .000 .24 .06 NS .42 .06 .027 .26 .07 NS
 Ethnicity -.47 -.07 .000 .05 .02 NS -.44 -.07 .010 .03 .01 NS
 Sex -.90 -.10 .000 -.32 -.12 .011 -.63 -.07 .017 -.48 -.13 :047
 Employment -.54 -.08 .000 -.06 -.02 NS -.51 -.09 .003 -.18 -.05 NS
 Physical Illness -.11 -.02 NS .05 .02 NS .15 .02 NS .11 .03 NS
 Mental Illness -.38 -.02 NS 2.01 .23 .000 -.01 -.01 NS .11 .01 NS
 Age -.19 -.02 NS .12 .05 NS -.05 -.01 NS .56 .17 .007
 Bail Status .83 .38 .000 .30 .25 .000 .75 .39 .000 .40 .32 .000
 Plea -.81 -.08 .000 .27 .06 NS -.43 -.05 NS .12 .02 NS
 Charge Reduction .14 .03 .041 -.07 -.02 NS .10 .02 NS -.27 .07 NS
 R2=.32 R2=.21 R2=.35 R2=.29
 Intercept= .537 Intercept=4.80 Intercept= .564 Intercept= 1 .33
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 erations may occur. Thus, our next inter-
 est is in comparing the effects of our inde-
 pendent variables on sentence severity,
 particularly in cases of college and less
 educated white-collar offenders. Com-
 parison of the latter offender-offense
 groupings will help to determine whether
 the lenient sentencing observed above for
 both of these groupings in District C fol-
 lows from similar or different types of
 considerations.
 Within District C, and in relation to the
 remaining districts, such comparisons re-
 veal very different patterns of effects. For
 example, we find in Table 4 that, con-
 sistent with our perspective, in District C
 statutory seriousness (the seriousness of
 the initial charge) has the biggest effect on
 the severity of the sentences received by
 college educated white-collar defendants
 (B= .42, p= .003). In contrast, the effects
 of this variable for the comparable cases
 in Table 5, and for the cases of less edu-
 cated white-collar criminals in Table 4,
 are negligible (B = .02 and .09).
 To extend our understanding of this
 rather striking difference, we generated
 the frequency distributions of statutory
 seriousness in both District C and the re-
 maining districts. These distributions are
 presented in Table 6. What we find is
 that, although this variable has approx-
 imately the same standard deviation in
 District C (s = 5.90) and in the other dis-
 tricts (s = 5.79), the difference between
 these distributions is nonetheless dra-
 matic. In District C, the modal initial
 charge carries a maximum sentence of one
 year in prison; in the remaining districts,
 the modal initial charge carries a
 Table 6. Frequency Distributions of Statutory Seri-
 ousness in District C and the Remaining
 Districts
 Remaining
 Maximum District C Districts
 No. of Years No. % No. %
 1 49 60.5 31 13.3
 2 2 2.5 15 6.4
 3 5 6.2 25 10.7
 5 24 29.2 156 67.0
 10 1 1.2 2 1.0
 15 0 0.0 4 1.7
 X =6.74 X =7.87
 s=5.90 s=5.79
 maximum sentence of five years. Beyond
 this, both distributions tend to be bimodal:
 each has a concentration of charges in the
 one- and five-year categories. The dif-
 ference is that District C has a bigger con-
 centration of cases toward the nonserious
 end of the continuum, while the remaining
 districts have their heaviest concentration
 of cases more toward the serious end. The
 bimodal character of these distributions is
 consistent with our suggestion that, to
 successfully build the evidence necessary
 to get convictions in major white-collar
 cases, it is necessary to offer concessions
 in other potentially serious cases. What is
 most interesting from our perspective,
 however, is that this pattern is particularly
 pronounced in District C, where white-
 collar crime has been pursued in a very
 proactive fashion.
 Also consistent with our perspective is
 the effect of the next most influential vari-
 able, the plea, in the sentencing of college
 educated white-collar criminals in District
 C. Those who plead guilty in District C (b
 =-1.27, p= .028) are more likely to get
 lenient sentences, while no similar signifi-
 cant effect (b= .12) exists in the remaining
 districts, or for less educated white-collar
 criminals in District C (b = -.26). From
 our perspective, the implication is that
 prosecutors in the proactive district are
 successful in getting judges to reward and
 punish the cooperativeness of college
 educated white-collar offenders. As ex-
 pected, then, the two most important
 variables explaining the tendency in Dis-
 trict C to sanction more leniently college
 educated white-collar criminals are their
 pleas and the initial charges placed against
 them. We will also discuss a quite dif-
 ferent pattern that is apparent in cases of
 less educated white-collar offenders.
 One other variable, charge reduction, is
 noteworthy for its absence of effect on the
 sentencing of white-collar cases in all dis-
 tricts. As indicated earlier in our discus-
 sion, this may be a result of the limited
 opportunities for charge reduction in the
 federal system. The effect of this situation
 may be to relegate much prosecutorial
 negotiation to less visible stages that pre-
 cede initial charging decisions. We have
 already noted that, in District C, the stat-
 utory seriousness of the initial charge has
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 its most pronounced effect for college
 educated white-collar criminals. In con-
 trast, in the more reactive remaining dis-
 tricts statutory seriousness has a promi-
 nent effect in the cases of less educated
 common criminals. The volume of these
 cases and the influence of this variable
 may reflect the tendency of these more
 reactive districts to balance the needs and
 wishes of the enforcement agencies that
 focus on more traditional crimes.
 We turn now to a consideration of a
 very different pattern of effects apparent
 in the sentencing of less educated white-
 collar criminals in both District C and the
 remaining districts. At this point it may be
 useful to recall that these cases consist in
 large part of income tax violations and
 bank clerk embezzlements. Since we did
 not anticipate the lenient treatment that
 these offenders receive in District C, our
 interpretation of these effects is, clearly,
 ad hoc. Nonetheless, we will begin by of-
 fering one suggestion as to why college
 and less educated white-collar criminals
 receive a similar type of leniency in Dis-
 trict C. This suggestion is no more com-
 plicated than the observation that similar
 types of charges are placed against these
 offenders and that, once concessions are
 granted to the higher status white-collar
 offenders, it may be difficult not to grant
 them more generally, at least where simi-
 lar statutory provisions are involved. In
 more familiar terms, a privilege once
 granted is difficult to deny later. Beyond
 this, it seems plausible to interpret the
 pattern of effects for this group in District
 C in terms of a compliance, as much as a
 punishment, model. Thus, the two most
 prominent findings for this group in Dis-
 trict C are that being employed results in
 more lenient sentences (B = -.24), while
 being under psychiatric treatment results
 in more severe sentences (B = .27). The
 former finding applies only in District C,
 while the latter finding applies in the re-
 maining districts as well. This second
 counter-intuitive finding apparently re-
 sults from a provision in the federal code
 which allows offenders thought mentally
 ill to be institutionalized for a 90-day
 "psychiatric study," and, then, to be re-
 sentenced at the end of this period. Alter-
 natively, the finding in District C of
 greater leniency for those offenders who
 remain employed probably reflects a
 willingness to let these offenders work out
 arrangements to make restitution in lieu of
 more severe punishments. The concern,
 at least in District C, would seem to be as
 much with remedying the behavior as with
 punishing it. In any case, we clearly have
 demonstrated that the differential leniency
 experienced by college and less educated
 white-collar offenders involves some very
 different considerations. We take this as
 support for our argument that the lenient
 sentencing of white-collar persons for
 their white-collar crimes derives from a
 set of circumstances that distinguish the
 proactive prosecution of this type of case.
 A final finding, consistent across all
 districts, merits our attention. This finding
 is that bail status has a substantial impact
 on sentencing that is particularly consis-
 tent for common criminals (the B's range
 from .24 to .39). The implication of this
 finding is that negative bail decisions have
 particularly disadvantaging consequences
 for all kinds of common criminals. This
 finding is not new, but it is nonetheless
 interesting to find that it holds in the fed-
 eral courts, bound by the Federal Bail
 Reform Act, as well as in the state courts
 (see Bernstein et al., 1977).
 CONCLUSIONS
 Gilbert Geis (1974) has made two im-
 portant points about the study of white-
 collar crime. The first point is that rela-
 tively few original pieces of research have
 been published on white-collar crime
 during the past two decades (see also
 Wheeler, 1976). The second point is that
 further study of white-collar crime is im-
 portant because it can tell us a great deal
 about the way power is exercised in our
 society. To these important points, we
 would add another: examination of the
 prosecution and sentencing of white-collar
 crime can tell us much about how the so-
 cial organization of a particular type of
 crime can influence the way it is con-
 trolled. In turn, this type of understanding
 may do much to enlighten a long tradition
 of research on status characteristics and
 sentencing.
 We noted in the beginning of our dis-
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 cussion that the above type of sentencing
 research has suffered from inadequate
 data. The inadequacy of these data is less
 the failing of social researchers than it is a
 failure of the system to prosecute and
 sentence any large volume of important
 white-collar cases. The infrequency of
 these prosecutions derives not only from
 the power of the persons involved but also
 from the manner in which these criminal
 activities are organized. Most common
 crime involves victims or witnesses and is
 pursued reactively in response to their
 complaints. In contrast, most white-collar
 crime involving white-collar persons is
 characterized by a diffuseness of
 victimization and an absence of unimpli-
 cated witnesses. As a result, a proactive
 organization of legal resources usually is
 required to seek out and build these
 white-collar cases. Since, frequently, only
 the participants in these criminal events
 can provide the information necessary to
 build successful cases, prosecutorial
 negotiation becomes a key part of the pro-
 active prosecution of these cases. Fur-
 thermore, to make this negotiation work,
 a connection must be forged between the
 prosecutorial and judicial subsystems,
 such that the promises and concessions
 offered white-collar offenders are actually
 confirmed at sentencing. We have argued
 that this type of connection is the excep-
 tion more than the rule in a criminal jus-
 tice process we have called a loosely
 coupled system.
 The overall implication of the organ-
 izational relationships we have described
 is, of course, that white-collar persons will
 receive lenient sentences for their white-
 collar crimes. However, it is important to
 note that this disparity might be expected
 only where the prosecution of white-collar
 cases is proactive enough to generate a
 large volume of cases. This is, of course,
 exactly what we found in our data: college
 educated white-collar criminals received
 more-lenient sentences only in District C,
 our most proactive district.
 What we did not anticipate on the basis
 of the perspective developed in this paper
 is that less educated white-collar criminals
 would also receive lenient sentences in
 District C. A question that follows from
 this finding is whether the white-collar
 crimes of more-highly educated persons
 are actually handled in the unique way our
 perspective suggests. However, our sub-
 sequent analysis of cases falling within the
 separate offender-offense groupings con-
 firmed that quite different factors were in-
 volved in the sentencing of each, and that
 college educated white-collar persons in-
 deed were sentenced on the basis of sev-
 eral of the considerations emphasized by
 our perspective. In an ad hoc fashion, we
 speculated that one reason less educated
 white-collar criminals may also receive
 lenient sentences in District C is because
 they are charged under similar statutes:
 once these statutes are used in a lenient
 fashion, it may be difficult to deny their
 wider application. This interpretation is
 consistent with our earlier findings that at
 a bivariate level it is college educated
 white-collar criminals who actually re-
 ceive the most-lenient sentences in Dis-
 trict C, and that it is a higher concentra-
 tion of this latter type of case in District C
 that makes it most unique. Nonetheless,
 we take these findings collectively as indi-
 cating the importance of further research
 on the ways in which types of persons,
 crimes, and control strategies interact.
 More generally, our findings have
 theoretical-as well as policy-
 implications. They suggest, on the one
 hand, why previous research has rarely
 found relationships between status char-
 acteristics and sentencing to be large: as
 critics have suggested, there simply may
 not have been enough variation in the
 types of offenders and offenses studied to
 generate such relationships. This does not
 make the prior research wrong; it simply
 makes it representative of the types of
 courts studied. On the other hand, the
 modest relationship reported in this study,
 for District C (r= .21; b= -2.72; B= -.16),
 may be all the more striking given that-
 even in this proactive district-college
 educated white-collar criminals make up
 only 11.7% of the population sentenced
 (cf. Cohen and Cohen, 1975:178). The
 interesting possibility this point raises is
 that the observed relationship may grow
 as the volume of cases (or, in other words,
 the level of proactive prosecution) in-
 creases. Put differently, there may be an
 inverse relationship between the volume
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 of white-collar convictions and the sever-
 ity of white-collar sentences. At this
 point, concerns about deterrence and
 equal treatment may come into conflict:
 convictions may be enough to deter some
 white-collar crime, but they are not
 enough to establish a sense of parity in the
 treatment of white-collar and common
 crime.
 These concerns are aggravated by the
 further findings that the lenient sentencing
 of college educated white-collar criminals
 in our proactive district apparently is as-
 sociated with the less-serious charges
 placed against these offenders and with a
 rewarding of their guilty pleas. The sense
 is of a style of prosecution that gives pref-
 erential treatment to highly educated
 white-collar offenders. That this may be
 what is required to successfully prosecute
 important white-collar cases is an un-
 comfortable paradox that policy makers
 as well as theorists will do well to con-
 sider.
 We should also note other less central,
 but no less significant, findings of this re-
 search. Among the less educated white-
 collar criminals in District C, we found
 that employment and mental illness were
 prominent factors in determining sen-
 tences: employment led to leniency, while
 treatment for mental illness resulted in se-
 verity. The latter finding was explained in
 terms of a federal provision that allows
 offenders thought mentally ill to be placed
 in penal institutions for psychiatric study;
 the former finding probably reflects a
 willingness to allow offenders in this
 grouping who are still employed to work
 out arrangements for making restitution.
 We suggested that in cases of less edu-
 cated white-collar criminals the concern
 may be as much with obtaining com-
 pliance as with imposing punishment. Fi-
 nally, quite apart from the preceding
 group of offenders, we also found that bail
 decisions have pronounced effects on the
 sentencing of common criminals. A
 theoretical implication of this finding is
 that bail outcomes may constitute one of
 the most salient kinds of legal labelling
 that common criminals experience.
 The findings of this research do not en-
 courage a reliance on law reform as an
 effective means of reducing sentence dis-
 parities. Notwithstanding important re-
 forms in the federal bail system, we have
 found that bail decisions still exert a per-
 sistent impact on the severity of the sen-
 tences received by common criminals.
 Even more significantly, however, we
 suggest that the independence and varia-
 bility of prosecutors demonstrated in this
 study is a neglected consideration which
 should reduce widespread expectations
 that recodification of the criminal law,
 sentencing guidelines, and reform or
 elimination of parole will eliminate sen-
 tencing disparities. Such reforms can
 readily be counteracted by shifts in prose-
 cutorial policies on charging and plea bar-
 gaining and this seems particularly likely
 in an area as socially and legally sensitive
 as white-collar crime. The differential
 sentencing of white-collar offenders is a
 social as well as a legal problem.
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